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2: The Foreign
Involvement
By Mohamed A. El-Khawas
I n a recent issue of The American Scholar, Leila Fawaz, an associate professor of history and diplomacy at Tufts University, wrote:
“The conflict [in Lebanon] since 1975, 
although it has an internal Lebanese di­
mension, has also been a theater of war for 
all the hostile powers of the Middle East: a 
Syrian war, an Israeli war, a Palestinian 
war, an Arab-Israeli war, an Arab war, a 
great powers and superpowers conflict.”1 
The situation Professor Fawaz de­
scribes has come about because the feud­
ing Lebanese factions — the Christians 
(Maronites), the Muslims (mainly Shiites) 
and the Druze — plus the Palestinians 
have been susceptible to external pres­
sures as the civil strife has grown more 
fierce since 1975.
The political and religious factionalism 
has fostered a volatile environment in 
which Lebanese warlords have sought mil­
itary assistance from neighboring coun­
tries. In addition, the global political 
environment in which these factions have 
been operating made it relatively easy to 
receive encouragement and material as­
sistance from foreign powers.
Both regional and super powers — Arab 
states, Israel and the United States — 
have scrambled for influence through di­
rect intervention in the divided nation, 
with the Americans and the Israelis paying 
a heavy price for their actions.
Syrian Versus Arab Involvement 
The Arab states have been challenged by 
the Lebanese crisis, which has fostered 
competition between moderate and radical 
Arabs. The Arab states do not constitute a 
monolithic group and they rarely take a 
unified stand on regional problems. This is 
particularly true with such an extraor­
dinarily complex situation as is found in 
Lebanon. Several of the Arab states — 
both moderate and radical — have become
increasingly involved in Lebanon since 
1975, giving the warring factions military 
aid to assist them in attaining their political 
objectives.
The outbreak of violence in early 1975, 
which culminated in a full-scale civil war, 
paved the way for major escalation in the 
level of foreign intervention in Lebanon. In 
particular, Syria saw an opportunity to be 
a broker in the Lebanese conflict, giving it 
a chance to enforce its long elusive Pax 
Syriana. In June 1976, Syria sent its 
troops into Lebanon — an action that 
marked the first stage in the “internation­
alization” of the conflict. Around the same 
time, President Hafez al-Assad sur­
prisingly shifted his support from the 
Muslim leftists and their Palestinian back­
ers to the hard-pressed Christian right­
ists, who appeared to be on the verge of 
defeat.
This Syrian intervention added a poten­
tially dangerous dimension to the conflict 
and threatened direct foreign military in­
tervention by other powers. Arab states in 
particular could not sit idle after the Syrian 
Army took up positions in the Bekaa Val­
ley and started closing in on the Palestin­
ians in Beirut. In a hurriedly convened 
meeting in Cairo, the Arab League de­
cided to send a Pan-Arab peacekeeping 
force to replace the Syrian army in 
Lebanon.
Assad, however, had no intention of 
pulling out of eastern Lebanon. Instead, 
he invited other states in the Arab League 
to send token forces to join the Syrians in 
Lebanon. Assad directly contacted Al­
geria’s Hourai Boumedienne and Libya’s 
Muammar al-Qaddafi and secured their 
approval to send small contingents to join 
his army in Lebanon. Faced with this fa it 
accompli, the Arab League convinced 
Saudi Arabia and the Sudan to contribute 
to the emerging Pan-Arab force. This was 
a good compromise for Syria: “The Syr­
ians agreed to demands from other Arabs
for ‘Arabization’ of the crisis, while re­
maining the pre-eminent force.”2 Syria’s 
military presence was legitimized by the 
mandate from the Arab League, so that 
Syria was now viewed neither as occupier 
nor as uninvited guest.
The Lebanese Christians were not 
pleased with the presence of Libyan and 
Algerian troops, both hard-line members 
of the Arab “Rejectionist Front.” They 
feared that they might join their arch­
enemies — the radical Muslim factions and 
the Palestinians. But the inclusion of Saudi 
and Sudanese forces eased their fears 
somewhat. They did not mind letting As­
sad try to impose some kind of order in 
Lebanon as long as the power of the Chris­
tian Maronites — who had dominated the 
government since 1943 — remained 
intact.
Syria’s mission was to prevent further 
escalation of the fighting in order to pave 
the way for a political solution but, despite 
Assad’s efforts, a political solution has 
remained elusive. Repeated attempts to 
establish a cease-fire have proved futile 
over the years and Syria has instead found 
itself caught in the web of Lebanese pol­
itics. If anything, the feuding factions have 
hardened their positions as a result of the 
terrible bloodshed of recent years. This 
has led to still further foreign intervention 
and has greatly complicated the search for 
a political solution to Lebanon’s civil strife.
The Israeli Connection
Israel, which had kept a close watch on the 
fast-moving events in Lebanon, saw an 
opportunity for intervention to prevent a 
victory by a nationalist-leftist-Palestinian 
coalition in Lebanon. Since the mid-1970s, 
Israel has allied itself with the Christian 
Phalangist forces, then headed by Bashir 
Gemayel. It also supported Major Saad 
Haddad, the commander of the Christian 
militia in southern Lebanon.3 Israel has 
trained and armed the Christians to fight 
the radical Muslims, who were loosely
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allied with the Palestine Liberation Orga­
nization (PLO).
The intensified fighting in 1976 led 
Israel’s Labor government to discuss ways 
to aid the battered Christian forces. In the 
months before the Syrian invasion in June 
1976, Israel had responded favorably to 
Christian pleas for arms and ammunitions. 
By May, Israel had begun delivering weap­
ons to Christian forces in eastern Leba­
non. The deliveries included U. S. M-16 ri­
fles, Russian 122-mm. rockets and T-54 
tanks.4
Between May and late August, Israel’s 
Defense Minister Shimon Peres clan­
destinely paid four visits to the Christian- 
controlled port of Jounieh, nine miles 
north of Beirut. During his third visit, he 
was accompanied by Premier Yitzhak 
Rabin, who held meetings with Christian 
leaders (including former President 
Camille Chamoun and President-elect 
Elias Sarkis) and a group of moderate 
Muslims (including former Premier 
Rashid Karami).5
During these meetings, the Israeli offi­
cials encouraged the Christians and the 
moderate Muslims to form an alliance 
against the Palestinians and the Muslim 
leftists. More importantly, Israel also 
agreed to initiate military action to wipe 
out PLO bases in southern Lebanon, 
which had posed threats to its security. In 
September 1976, Israel’s Foreign Minister 
Yigal Allon stated that “a situation will be 
created in which we will not permit any 
faction to allow the Palestine Liberation 
Organization to act against Israel from 
Lebanese regions close to the border. ”6
This secret agreement was a turning 
point in the Lebanese civil war, as Israel’s 
role changed from that of arms supplier to 
a limited partner in a coalition against the 
Palestinians and Muslim leftists. From 
this time on, Israel secretly joined the civil 
war in Lebanon and took military action to 
help its Christian allies. On September 13, 
1976, Time magazine reported that 
Israel’s involvement was drawn along the 
following lines:
□  Israel [was] maintaining a naval block­
ade of several leftist-controlled Lebanese 
ports, particularly Sidon and Tyre, thus 
keeping arms from reaching beleaguered 
leftist-Palestinian forces. The Israelis 
[had] so far intercepted 15 ships and tor­
pedoed three others that tried to escape 
their patrols. Of the 15, six were ordered 
to Haifa, where weapons were removed— 
and later shipped to Lebanese Christians
— and several terrorists were 
apprehended.
□  Israel [was] now training a battalion of 
. . . Lebanese Christian and Muslim 
troops in tank warfare at an Israeli base on 
the edge of the Sinai desert. . . . When 
the training [was] finished, they [would] 
be sent back to Lebanon with 38 Amer­
ican-made M-50 Sherman tanks.
□  [Israel had] gained what amounted] to 
de facto control over a strip of territory in
. . . Israel and Syria had 
both moved against the 
Palestinians and the 
radical Muslims.
southern Lebanon, reaching up to the 
Litani River. . . .  In addition, the Israelis 
[were] trying to arm and train Lebanese 
villagers in the area to guard against a 
renewal of Palestinian power.7
Ironically, it had turned out that Israel 
and Syria had both moved against the 
Palestinians and the radical Muslims. This 
was evident in the fact that Syria felt 
relatively secure along the confrontation 
line in the Golan Heights. Syria withdrew 
its five armored divisions along the Israeli- 
occupied Golan Heights and moved them 
either to Lebanon or to the eastern border 
with Iraq, its hostile neighbor. This action 
left only one armored division to protect 
Syria’s capital Damascus against attack by 
Israel.8
At the beginning, Israel’s Labor govern­
ment did not mind Syria’s military inter­
vention in Lebanon since Damascus had 
established a de facto alliance with the pro- 
Israel, pro-Western Maronite Pha- 
langists. The Israelis were willing to let 
Syria try to prevent further escalation of 
the fighting in Lebanon in order to find a 
political solution that would leave the 
power base of the Christian Maronites 
intact.
In 1977, the coming to power of the 
Likud government, under Menachem Be­
gin, led to further escalation of Israel’s 
involvement in Lebanon. Begin was deter­
mined to wipe out the PLO bases in south­
ern Lebanon. To accomplish this objec­
tive, Israel first intensified its air raids 
against Palestinian positions and, then, in 
1978, invaded Lebanon directly. In doing 
so, Israel violated U. S. laws that prohibit 
the use of American-made weapons in 
offensive wars.
Following the invasion of Lebanon, 
Israel installed U.S.-made armored hard­
ware in the southern part of the country 
and ignored repeated American requests 
for their removal. Even when the Israelis 
later claimed that they had complied with 
the U.S. request, photographs taken by 
U.S. satellites showed otherwise. Presi­
dent Jimmy Carter was outraged by 
Israel’s false claims and threatened to ask 
Congress to halt arms sales to Israel un­
less the weapons were removed from 
southern Lebanon. It was only then that 
the Begin government bowed to Carter’s 
pressure.9
Shortly thereafter, the Israelis with­
drew from Lebanon but continued their air 
strikes against the Palestinian camps and 
continued to provide assistance to Chris­
tian forces. It was estimated that Israel 
gave the Phalangist militia, under Bashir 
Gemayel, some $250 million in military 
assistance between 1976 and 1982.10 
Israel’s aid was designed to “[turn] the 
country into a Phalangist-controlled 
state, ”n  according to Israeli Defense Min­
ister Ariel Sharon, the architect of a sec­
ond Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
The Begin government used a bullet 
attack on Israel’s ambassador in London as 
a pretext for conducting an all-out military 
action in June 1982 against the PLO forces 
in southern Lebanon. Again, Israel in­
vaded Lebanon. It is important to note that 
Begin had secured in advance the approval 
of U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
for the Lebanese invasion prior to Haig’s 
resignation from the State Department.12 
Haig shared Begin’s views on international 
terrorism and the danger of a Soviet pres­
ence in the Middle East. They both saw a 
strategic advantage in destroying the PLO 
strongholds in southern Lebanon, and to 
stifle radicalism in the area and weaken 
Soviet influence in the Arab world.
The Israeli invasion took place after “a 
year of unprecedented quiet on the 
Lebanese border”13 and at a time when
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1986 3
El-Khaw s: Lebanon: The Foreign Involvement
Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
Israel knew of a conclusion by the British 
government that the PLO had nothing to 
do with the attempt a month earlier on the 
Israeli envoy’s life. The planning for this 
invasion had, in fact, taken place three 
months prior to that incident and coin­
cided with the time that Israel was about 
to turn over the last portion of the Sinai to 
Egypt, following the Camp David Accords. 
This timing suggests that Begin had 
planned to use any excuse to invade 
Lebanon in order to rally the Israeli public 
behind his government. This is largely 
because turning the Sinai over to Egypt 
had not only caused a split within the Likud 
coalition but also had led to clashes with 
militant Israeli settlers in the occupied 
Arab territories.
The incident in London was all the li­
cense that Begin needed to undertake his 
plan to invade Lebanon and to wipe out 
PLO bases along Israel’s northern border. 
It was, nevertheless, a dangerous prece­
dent in the Lebanese crisis, indeed in the 
entire Middle East conflict. As journalist/ 
author Jacobo Timmerman has put it:
For the first time, war was not a re­
sponse to provocation. Before, even in the 
worst of cases, it had been preventive. The 
understanding of this fact after only four 
days of fighting, when there were doubts 
about the magnitude of the victory and the 
fears had vanished, was perhaps the first 
symptom of uneasiness that gripped some 
sectors of the country.14
Shortly after the invasion, it became 
evident that the Begin-Sharon plan was 
not confined to creating a security zone in 
southern Lebanon along Israel’s northern 
border but sought to force the PLO out of 
Lebanon altogether. The Israelis swept 
across the country and laid seige on West 
Beirut in preparation for a final assault on 
the Palestinians who were burrowed 
among several hundred thousand 
Lebanese civilians in the Muslim section 
of the capital. Israeli jets, gunboats, and 
artillery repeatedly shelled West Beirut, 
“hitting apartment buildings and hospitals 
along with Palestinian refugee camps. Ar­
mored Israeli bulldozers tore away PLO 
earthworks so tanks could rumble across 
the Green Line from Christian East Beirut 
to Muslim West. The [Israeli] Army took 
Beirut International Airport, seized the 
Lebanese Army’s own barracks and finally 
stopped in a garden near the refugee 
camps. PLO guerrillas stood and fought 
with handguns, Kalashnikov rifles and 
rocket-propelled grenades.”15
Although the Israeli aggression was 
condemned by the United Nations, Israel 
remained indifferent. This was exem­
plified in Begin’s address to 200 American 
members of the United Jewish Appeal in 
Israel in August 1982: “Nobody should 
preach to us.” He indicated that “Israel 
would continue the seige of west Beirut as 
it saw fit, regardless of international 
criticism.”16
Secretary of State George 
R Shultz used shuttle 
diplomacy to try to 
convince the Israeli and 
Syrian governments to 
pull their armies out of 
Lebanon.
The American Rescue Mission
The brutality of the Israeli invasion was 
repulsive to many Americans who raised 
questions about U.S. military assistance 
to Israel. As columnist William Raspberry 
put it:
Those were American planes and mis­
siles and tanks that smashed into 
Lebanon, leaving thousands of dead and 
maimed civilians, women and babies, in 
their wake. A t some point we will have to 
. . . deal with the fact that weapons, sup­
plied by us on the hard understanding that 
they will be used only for defensive pur­
poses, have been used to slaughter inno­
cents who were no threat to Israel.17
According to a Newsweek magazine poll 
conducted in August 1982, “nearly two in 
three Americans disapprove^] of Israel’s 
march into Lebanon and 43 percent be- 
lievefd] that Washington should suspend 
or cut off arms to Israel.”18 This led Presi­
dent Ronald Reagan to place a ban on the 
shipment of cluster bombs, which had 
been widely used by Israel against 
Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.
The Israeli invasion cast the net of for­
eign intervention in Lebanon still wider. 
The U. S. and other Western powers now
became directly involved in Lebanon in an 
effort to prevent the Israelis from launch­
ing a final assault on the PLO in West 
Beirut. As a first step, the U. S. decided to 
use diplomacy to try to avert the indis­
criminate killing of thousands of Palestin­
ian and Lebanese civilians if the Israelis 
used force to take over West Beirut.
U.S. special envoy Philip Habib was 
dispatched to the Middle East to work out 
an agreement to bring about a PLO with­
drawal and an end to Israel’s seige of West 
Beirut. In early September 1982, a multi­
national force — comprising 800 U. S. Ma­
rines, 800 French and 500 Italian troops — 
arrived in Beirut to supervise the evacua­
tion of about 6,000-7,000 PLO fighters 
from the Lebanese capital.19 The Palestin­
ians went to Syria, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, 
North Yemen, and South Yemen. After the 
evacuation, PLO leader Yassir Arafat set 
up his headquarters in Tunisia.
Following the evacuation of the PLO 
and the end of the Israeli seige of West 
Beirut, members of the multinational 
force withdrew from the Lebanese capital. 
Their departure proved to be premature, 
however. It left the Palestinian refugees at 
the mercy of the Israelis and their Chris­
tian allies, who wanted to sweep every 
vestige of the Palestinians out of Lebanon. 
Shortly thereafter, in late September 
1982, hundreds of Palestinian refugees 
were massacred by the Phalangist mili­
tiamen at the Sabra and Shatila camps in 
Beirut as the Israeli army supposedly was 
guarding the camps.20
The massacres raised a dilemma for the 
U. S ., which had guaranteed the safety of 
the Palestinians after the withdrawal of 
the PLO from Beirut.21 This incident 
brought back the multinational force for 
the second time in five weeks. Its task was 
to protect people and maintain peace in 
Beirut. The Reagan administration was 
now faced with a bigger challenge. It 
sought to persuade Israel and Syria to 
reach an agreement for troop withdrawal 
in order to pave the way for the establish­
ment of an independent and unified 
Lebanon, free from foreign armies.
Secretary of State George R Shultz 
used shuttle diplomacy to try to convince 
the Israelis and Syrian governments to 
pull their armies out of Lebanon. Syria
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was unwilling to cooperate, but Shultz got 
the Israelis and the Lebanese to sign an 
agreement on May 17, 1983 under which 
the Israelis agreed to pull out of Lebanon 
only when other foreign troops (i.e. the 
Syrians) also withdrew. To reward Israel 
for its cooperation, the Reagan adminis­
tration agreed to release F-16 fighter- 
bombers, which had been withheld “until 
the Israeli forces leave Lebanon.” 22
Syria, on the other hand, ignored U. S. 
calls for troop withdrawal and used its 
strong military and political presence in 
Lebanon to pressure President Amin 
Gemayel to abrogate the U.S,-sponsored 
agreement with Israel. Syrian officials 
made it clear that such action was neces­
sary if Gemayel wanted to implement his 
plan for “national reconciliation.” More­
over, Syria’s Lebanese allies refused to 
participate in a government of national 
unity unless that agreement was re­
pudiated.23
Syria’s intransigence frustrated the 
U.S., which has no leverage with Presi­
dent Assad. In response, the Reagan ad­
ministration decided to use the Marines to 
prop up the Gemayel government and to 
strengthen its role politically and militarily. 
This meant that the Marines would play a 
limited combat role in Lebanon.
By the fall of 1983, the military situation 
was deteriorating rapidly. It was now clear 
that foreign intervention was keeping the 
civil war brewing in Beirut. In September 
1983, for example, Israel decided to re­
duce its casualties by pulling out of Beirut 
and by abandoning its positions in the 
Chouf Mountains. This led to a scramble 
among the feuding Lebanese factions for 
control of the mountains overlooking 
Beirut. In fact, the U. S. used naval gunfire 
to prevent the Lebanese Army and Mar- 
onite Militia from defeat by Druze fighters 
who were entrenched in the mountains.24 
This combat role led the Druze to dispute 
the U. S. claims to impartiality. Ironically, 
it led them to join sides with Syria.
Israel’s abandonment of the Chouf 
Mountains meant trouble for the U.S. 
Marines; it exposed the flanks of the Ma­
rines at the Beirut Airport, leaving them 
dangerously vulnerable to sniper fire, ar­
tillery shelling, and terrorist attacks.
On October 23, 1983, suicide-bomb 
truck attacks on the headquarters of the
U. S. Marines and the French para­
troopers in Beirut left more than 300 peo­
ple dead and a score more wounded. 
American investigators concluded that the 
attack was carried out by the pro-Iranian 
Shiite Hizb Allah (Party of God) from the 
Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley — a finding 
that intensified U.S. conflicts with Syria 
and underlined the vulnerability of the 
Marines in Beirut. As General John Ves- 
sey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
. . . There was little the 
U. S. could do to get a 
settlement out of the Syr­
ians unless the Reagan ad­
ministration was willing to 
get more involved in the 
Lebanese civil war . . .
put it: the main concern of the Marine 
contingent “has become one of self-preser­
vation. They can’t serve any real purpose 
where they are. ”25 On November 7, 1983, 
Newsweek commented that “A unit of 
1,600 troops was woefully small to have 
any real effect upon the Gordian knot of 
Lebanese politics, and yet it was quite 
large enough to present an inviting target 
to terrorists.”26
The bomb attack on the Marine head­
quarters threw American policymakers 
into a quandary. Reagan’s response was to 
stand firm in Lebanon. He was supported 
by the majority of Americans, who felt 
that the Marines could not simply run in 
the face of attack.27 Nevertheless, Reagan 
had little choice but to find a way to bring 
the Marines home in order to prevent the 
bombing incident from becoming a major 
issue in his 1984 reelection bid.
U.S. and Israel: Partnership 
in Lebanon
In response to the deadly attack on the 
Marines and Syrian intransigence, Reagan 
decided to develop closer strategic coop­
eration with Israel in Lebanon. This deci­
sion was made on October 29, just six days
after the devastating attack on the Ma­
rines. It was reported that Shultz per­
suaded Reagan to revive the idea of a 
special political and military relationship 
with Israel in order to “confront Syria with 
an Israeli-American military threat.”28 
This was seen as a move that would com­
pel Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, thus 
paving the way for the Marines to return 
home and also helping to check the spread 
of Soviet influence in the Middle East. 
This was agreed upon over the objections 
of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Wein­
berger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of 
whom argued that “strategic cooperation” 
with Israel could imperil U.S. ties with 
such moderate Arab states as Saudi Ara­
bia and Jordan.29
France, whose unit suffered heavy 
losses from a suicide-bomb attack in Oc­
tober, was troubled by this U. S. embrace 
of Israel. The French feared that the U. S. - 
Israeli strategic collaboration would “im­
pede a settlement in Lebanon rather than 
hasten it.”30 They also feared that domes­
tic political pressures might lead U. S. Ma­
rines into a premature withdrawal and that 
American officials eventually might elect 
force over diplomacy to break the deadlock 
in Lebanon.
The new partnership was an abrupt 
change in direction for Reagan’s policy in 
the Middle East, especially because he 
was abandoning the diplomatic efforts that 
had been spearheaded by Saudi Arabia to 
get Syria to pull its troops out of Lebanon. 
This change reflected Reagan’s disen­
chantment and frustration with Syria’s re­
fusal to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, 
an action which would have put the U. S.- 
sponsored Israel-Lebanon agreement into 
effect. The U. S. had already endorsed the 
Israeli position that the withdrawal of its 
troops from southern Lebanon was con­
tingent on a simultaneous pullout by Syr­
ian forces. Thus, Syrian intransigence 
meant that the U.S. Marines must con­
tinue to be deployed in Beirut as part of 
the multinational peacekeeping force. Yet, 
Republican leaders in the United States 
were concerned about the safety of Amer­
ican forces, following the October attack, 
and wanted to bring the Marines home no 
later than the summer of 1984, before the 
presidential campaign moved into full 
swing. As top White House officials put it: 
the continued presence of the Marines in 
Beirut in 1984 could become “a serious 
political liability for Reagan. ” They added, 
“if we don’t solve it in the short run, it will
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consequently took measures to ensure the 
safety of the Marines, short of pulling 
them out of Beirut.
The shift toward U.S.-Israeli coopera­
tion certainly did not guarantee that the 
U.S. Marines would be coming home 
soon. This conclusion was reached by sev­
eral Pentagon strategists, who “noting the 
speed with which the Soviet Union re­
armed Syria [in 1982], doubt[ed] whether 
U.S.-Israeli military posturing [would] 
impress either the Syrians or the 
Soviets.”32
In fact, Assad was in a stronger posi­
tion: First, Syria was receiving new, so­
phisticated weapons from Moscow in 
order to enable it to withstand the Amer- 
ican-Israeli military presence and to re­
place equipment destroyed earlier. Sec­
ond, Syria had consolidated its grip on 
eastern Lebanon by helping the rebel fac­
tions of the PLO to oust Arafat and his 
loyalist troops from Tripoli. Third, by sup­
porting factions opposed to President 
Gemayel, Syria had become “the key 
player in that fractured country’s fu­
ture.”33 The result was that there was 
little the U. S. could do to get a settlement 
out of the Syrians unless the Reagan ad­
ministration was willing to get more in­
volved in the Lebanese civil war, which had 
all the ingredients of a Vietnam-style con­
flict. This was certainly an undesirable 
prospect for Reagan in an election year.
A series of events over the next few 
months suggest that the Reagan adminis­
tration was following Israel’s advice to 
develop “disincentives” that would pres­
sure Syria out of Lebanon: (1) on the eve of 
Premier Yitzhak Shamir’s visit to Washing­
ton in October, Reagan decided to keep 
the battleship USS New Jersey off the 
Lebanese coast indefinitely; (2) on De­
cember 4, 1983, the U.S. carried out a 
belated retaliatory raid on Syrian positions 
in Lebanon, which came in the aftermath 
of a similar Israeli attack; (3) shortly 
thereafter, a policy of instant retaliation 
was put in force in an effort to protect the 
U. S. Marines in Beirut and to discourage 
other terrorist attacks on American tar­
gets in the Middle East.
In response to this “gunboat diplo­
macy,” Syrian officials denounced U.S. 
attacks on their positions in eastern 
Lebanon, and made it known that their 
government would not “budge an inch” 
from its stance on Lebanon despite mount­
ing American pressure.34 As one observer
noted, this situation was likely to lead to a 
major war with a possibility of “forcing] 
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to 
become more deeply and dangerously ent­
wined in the Middle East than perhaps 
either superpower would like.”35
There was evidence already that the 
area of conflict would be widened. On 
December 12, 1983, American, French, 
and Kuwaiti installations in Kuwait were 
bombed. These incidents signalled the be­
ginning of a terrorist campaign against
There is no guarantee that 
Assad will succeed in 
finding a formula that will 
be acceptable to all of the 
feuding factions.
American interests in the Middle East 
and, possibly, against targets inside the 
U. S. There was little the U. S. could do to 
prevent such attacks.
Thus, the U.S. policy of cooperation 
with Israel did not appear to hasten the 
return of the Marines. The prospects 
might have been different if the Israelis 
were willing to take over more respon­
sibilities in the war-torn country. Israel, 
however, had no interest in getting more 
deeply involved in the Lebanese civil war. 
In fact, morale was low in Israel due to the 
heavy casualties inflicted on Israeli troops 
by terrorist and guerrilla attacks. Con­
sequently, Shamir was under pressure to 
end Israel’s involvement in Lebanon as 
soon as possible. As a Washington Post 
editorial put it: “The Israelis seem little 
interested in doing anything in Lebanon 
these days except cutting their losses on a 
timetable of their own choosing. But this 
stage of the mess is Israel’s doing, and 
Israel has a responsibility to help Amer­
ican diplomacy clean it up.”36
By making Israel into his preeminent 
ally in Lebanon, Reagan ended his stance 
as a mediator in the Lebanese conflict. 
One immediate result was shifting his 
focus away from finding a broader settle­
ment to the Lebanese problem and toward 
dealing only with the fallout from Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon.
Disengagement or Intervention
By early 1984, it was evident that the 
American-Israeli strategic cooperation 
had not succeeded in pressuring Assad to 
withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
Lack of progress toward ending the foreign 
military presence in Lebanon resulted in a 
new U. S. plan to get the Marines out of 
Lebanon in order to avoid another disaster 
that could be detrimental to Reagan’s bid 
for reelection.
On February 8, Reagan ordered a 
phased pullback of the Marines from 
Beirut to Navy ships offshore. This deci­
sion was made following a dramatic turn of 
events in Lebanon in early February; the 
resignation of Gemayel’s cabinet; the dis­
integration of the Lebanese National 
Army, with Muslim units either defecting 
or refusing to fight; and the seizure of West 
Beirut by the Druze and Shiite militias.37 
Under these circumstances, Reagan was 
torn between the need to expand the U. S. 
contingent to bolster the Gemayel govern­
ment and the need to pull out of the 
turmoil in Lebanon. Reagan chose the 
latter because the former was too risky in 
an election year.
In doing so, U. S. credibility suffered a 
major setback, leaving Gemayel alone to 
face the crisis as the British and Italians 
decided to withdraw their units in the 
multinational force out of Lebanon. 
France, on the other hand, decided to 
stay,38 hoping to convince the United Na­
tions to send a peacekeeping force to 
Beirut. Following the U.S. withdrawal, 
Shiite Amal militia took over the positions, 
including the Beirut Airport, held by the 
U.S. Marines.
Israel found itself caught in a no-win 
situation in the longest war in its history. 
Israeli military analysts pointed out that 
“Israel [was] fully extended in terms of 
personnel and overextended financially.
. . . Israel [was] vulnerable.”39This situa­
tion divided the Israelis and ignited a 
heated national debate. The Lebanese de­
bacle had its toll on Israeli politicians. 
Sharon, the mastermind behind the 
Lebanese invasion, was forced out of of­
fice following the completion of the Com­
mission of Enquiry’s investigation into the 
massacres of Palestinian refugees in West 
Beirut. He was forced to resign from his 
position as defense minister in the Likud 
government.
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Moreover, Begin became disillusioned 
as the war dragged on. The Israeli Army 
suffered a large number of casualties from 
Lebanese resistance to the Israeli occupa­
tion of southern Lebanon. Surprisingly, 
Begin decided to step down from his office 
as prime minister, leaving Shamir as the 
caretaker until the next election.
When the election results proved to be 
inconclusive, the Likud coalition and the 
Labor Party decided to form a govern­
ment of national unity, with Peres as the 
prime minister during the first half of the 
term in office. This “unity” government 
decided to start pulling out of Lebanon in 
January 1985 and to turn southern 
Lebanon over to their Christian allies. 
Israel also continued to arm and train the 
Christian miltia — South Lebanese Army 
— in order to bolster the militia’s capabili­
ties in southern Lebanon.
In retrospect, the Israeli occupation of 
southern Lebanon resulted in the radi- 
calization of Lebanon’s one million Shiites, 
who had long been deprived of power and 
wealth under the Maronite government. 
They turned against Israel, which had 
received their support during the early 
days of the invasion. This change came 
about because of Israel’s heavy-handed 
tactics to subjugate the south and Israel’s 
close ties with Lebanese Christians. The 
Shiite Amal militia was fighting against the 
Israelis and their Christian allies. They 
particularly resented the capture by the 
Israelis (on their way out of Lebanon) of 
more than 700 Shiites and their detain­
ment at Atlit prison in Israel. The Shiites 
resolved to free their fellow citizens at any 
cost. This led them to strike not only 
against Israel but also against the U.S., 
Israel’s arms supplier and financial backer.
The strategic cooperation between the 
U. S. and Israel in Lebanon thus has 
turned into a liability for the U. S., which 
has become a target of terrorist attacks. 
An example was the hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847 in June 1985 and the killing of an 
American passenger. The Shiite hijackers 
demanded the release of more than 700 
Shiite detainees in Israel in return for the 
release of the TWA plane and its pas­
sengers whom they held as hostages. 
Faced with the prospect of another hos­
tage crisis similar to that of Tehran, Rea­
gan was forced to solicit the assistance of 
Syria’s President Assad — an old foe — 
whom he “had so often attacked in the past 
as a prime trouble-maker.” Assad emer­
ged as “a key mover in the quest to free 
the [American] hostages. ”40
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Assad and Reagan used quiet diplomacy 
to convince Shiite Amal leader Nabih Barri 
and Israel’s Premier Peres to work out a 
compromise to exchange the release of the 
TWA hostages in Beirut and the Shiite 
detainees in Israel without giving the im­
pression that either the U.S. or Israel 
capitulated to terrorist demands. The 
TWA hostages were the first to be re­
leased, followed by a phased release of 
Shiite prisoners by Israel.
Assad’s role in the hijacking melodrama 
has demonstrated that Syria is undoubt­
edly the only power broker capable of 
imposing some order in Lebanon. 
Gemayel has little choice but to deal with 
Assad, who now holds all the cards. This is 
particularly true for the following reasons: 
First, the U. S. has been shut out of play­
ing any meaningful role in the Lebanese 
crisis and Israel has become more con­
cerned with its own security than with 
imposing a solution on the Lebanese prob­
lem. Second, Syria has bolstered its posi­
tion in Lebanon by allying itself with Druze 
and Shiite factions and by only allowing 
pro-Syrian Palestinian groups to stay in 
the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.
It will certainly be difficult to work out a 
political solution for the long-drawn 
Lebanese conflict. Syrian officials have 
been working with Gemayel to save the 
government of national unity, whose sur­
vival is vital for a return to normality. They 
have been trying to establish and uphold a 
cease-fire, which still seems to be elusive. 
The immediate task is to end the artillery 
duels that have been flaring sporadically 
along the Green Line that separates Chris­
tian East Beirut from the Muslim West. 
This is essential if the warring parties will 
ever sit down together to work out a 
compromise that would allow a unified 
Lebanon.
Conclusion
The decade-old civil strife made Lebanon 
an inviting arena for foreign intervention. 
Regional forces were the first to exploit 
the situation. Both Syria and Israel di­
rectly intervened by sending their armies 
into Lebanon. Such military intervention 
prolonged the internal conflict and led to a 
widening of foreign involvement in the 
war-torn country.41
The Israeli invasion in the summer of 
1982 brought the U. S. and other Western 
powers into the Lebanese conflict. They 
first sent a multinational force to supervise 
the PLO evacuation and to end Israel’s
seige of Muslim West Beirut. They re­
turned again to protect lives and maintain 
peace in the Lebanese capital following the 
massacres of Palestinians in two refugee 
camps in West Beirut. The multinational 
force then was trapped in Beirut because 
of the presence of Syrian and Israeli forces 
in Lebanon.
It would take another 17 months before 
such foreign involvement would be re­
duced. American officials first tried, un­
successfully, to convince Syria’s President 
Assad to withdraw from Lebanon. Later, 
following the suicide bomb attacks on the 
headquarters of the U.S. Marines and 
French paratroopers in Beirut, American 
troops became engaged in a limited com­
bat role to support the Gemayel govern­
ment, including the shelling of Syrian and 
Druze positions by the USS New Jersey. 
All of these efforts failed to sway Assad to 
pull out of Lebanon. Reagan was left with 
no choice but to get the Marines out of 
Beirut in order to prevent them from be­
coming a damaging issue in his reelection 
campaign.
The withdrawal of the U. S. Marines 
from Lebanon in February 1984 resulted in 
a decision by the British and the Italians to 
end their role in the multinational force. 
This left Israel with the prospect of being 
alone in a no-win situation in Lebanon. 
Israel’s involvement in Lebanon had been 
costly, especially in the mounting casu­
alties and in dividing the Israeli public. 
Israel’s change in government in the sum­
mer of 1984 resulted in its decision to end 
its occupation of southern Lebanon. In do­
ing so, it left Syria as the only foreign 
power still in Lebanon.
Syria’s Assad is now in a strategic posi­
tion to influence the outcome of the inter­
nal power struggle in Lebanon. He has not 
only backed the Gemayel government but 
also has formed alliance with Druze and 
Shiite factions. In addition, he has split the 
PLO, leaving only pro-Syrian Palestinian 
factions in eastern Lebanon. As one 
Lebanese observer recently said: “Noth­
ing happens in Lebanon without Syria’s ap­
proval. ”
There is no guarantee that Assad will 
succeed in finding a formula that will be 
acceptable to all of the feuding factions. 
But at the moment he is the only power 
broker able to pressure them to accept a 
compromise that will offer a fair distribu­
tion of power within the Lebanese govern­
ment. This is a necessity because, after 
the years of strife and accumulated bitter
memories, there can be no return to the 
status quo ante that left the minority Mar- 
onite Christians with a monopoly of power 
for more than 40 years.
Time will only tell whether Lebanon will 
disintegrate or survive as an independent 
and unified nation or whether it will remain 
under the tutelage of Syria indefinitely. □
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